capital flows on national economies and central bank policies, particularly in nations on the gold standard which raise interest rates to defend gold reserves. Temin indicates that " [...] it would be nice to choose between the alternative models, [but] this does not seem possible at the current state of our knowledge. [...] Economists do not yet know enough about international transmission of financial crises to have a single model, or even to choose which transmission channel was most important. '" 0 Our data-collection endeavors enable us to answer question such as: Which channel transmitted the banking crisis from Europe to the United States in the third quarter of 1931? Did direct links exist between the banking crises in Germany and the United States? Did deposits, debt, correspondent relationships, or some other financial factor link the fate of money-center banks in New York to the fate of banks in Germany?
This remainder of this essay answers those questions. Section 2 describes the quantitative, qualitative, and narrative sources of evidence. Section 3 examines patterns in the aggregate evidence which suggest a direct link between the crisis in Europe and the United States. Section 4 describes our statistical tests and econometric results. Section 5 examines contemporary evidence of the causes of bank distress in the central money market during the summer of 1931. Section 6 examines contemporary accounts of the regulatory regime changes that raised rates of bank distress in the central money market of the United States during the summer of 1931. Section 7 discusses the implications of this evidence.
While the aggregate evidence suggests that a direct link existed between the financial crisis in Europe and the surge in bank failures in the central money market of the United States during the summer of 1931, the microeconomic evidence proves otherwise. Banks in New York City with substantial exposure to foreign financial flows survived the crisis of 1931 and the contraction as a whole. Many of them remained profitable and paid dividends throughout the 1930s.
The correlation between the financial crisis on the continent and bank distress in New York City was coincidental, not causal. Bank distress in the central money market of the United States peaked during the summer of 1931 for reasons unrelated to financial incidents across the Atlantic. Political pressure and regulatory reform determined the timing of events in New York City. The impetus for these reforms arose from the failure of The Bank of United States in December, 1930 , and the criticism directed at the Superintendent of Banks for the State of New York for his role in that institution's collapse.
II. Data
Several sources provide the quantitative, qualitative, and narrative information needed to investigate the issues at hand. Quantitative sources contain data useful for econometrically analyzing the performance of New York City banks. Qualitative sources report contemporary conclusions concerning the causes of bank distress. Narrative sources describe events in the central money market during the financial crisis in the summer and fall of 1931 and the change in the regulatory regime that occurred at that time.
Several sources provide quantitative information on banks' characteristics. Rand McNally Bankers ' Directory provides data balance sheet figures, correspondents networks, Federal Reserve membership, and the services provided to depositors. Rand McNally also indicates 10 Ibid.
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for most sizeable New York banks whether the institution provided its customers with international transaction services and whether the institution possessed foreign branches. Rand McNally published biennially. Observations drawn from the July issue provide a panel of annual observations on state and national banks at their spring calls.
The Annual Report of the Superintendent of Banks of the State of New York provides more detailed financial data for state-chartered banks and trust companies. The information comes quarterly. It includes details of bank balance sheets, including the composition of investments (e.g. loans by type of collateral, stocks, bonds, discounts, cash, and deposits in other banks) and the composition of liabilities (e.g. time deposits, demand deposits, and borrowings from banks). The New York Times provides information on bank balance sheets in a weekly column entitled "New York Weekly Bank Statements." The information includes demand, time, and foreign-branch deposits for all members of the clearing house and for many additional institutions. The Senate Hearings on the Sale of Foreign Bonds or Securities in the United States report loans to Germany arranged by banks in New York and outstanding when the banking crisis ignited on the continent."
The call reports collected by the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve Board provide more detailed information for banks belonging to the Federal Reserve System. For state-chartered member banks, balance sheets and income statements survive for the December and June calls for the first five years of the depression (i.e. December 1929 through December 1933 12 The balance sheets provide detailed data about bank's foreign exposure. Schedule G indicates holdings of foreign government bonds and other foreign securities. Schedule I indicates balances due in dollars and foreign currencies from foreign banks and foreign branches of U.S. banks. Schedule J indicates balances due to banks in foreign countries. Schedule L indicates time deposits of foreign banks and trust companies. Schedule D indicates the number of branches in foreign countries. A balance sheet also exists for each foreign branch, which provides additional information about overseas operations.
Information on changes in banks' status -such as suspensions, liquidations, mergers of solvent institutions, and consolidations forced by financial difficulties -comes from the archives of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors' Division of Bank Operations. From 1929 through 1933, the Board recorded information about changes in bank status on three forms. Form St. 6386a reported bank consolidations. A consolidation was the corporate union of two or more banks into one bank which continued operations as a single business entity and under a single charter. Some consolidations involved banks in financial difficulties. These consolidations often occurred at the behest of regulators, who sought to combine solvent but illiquid banks with healthier institutions. The Federal Reserve classified these events as consolidations due to financial difficulties.
Form St. 6386b reported bank suspensions. A suspension occurred when a bank closed its doors to depositors and ceased conducting normal banking business for at least one business day. Some, but not all, suspended banks reopened for business. A liquidation was a permanent suspension. A liquidating bank closed its doors to the public, surrendered its charter, and repaid depositors, usually under the auspices of a court appointed officer known as a receiver.
Form St. 6386b included a section indicating the cause of a bank's suspension. 13 Federal Reserve attributed most suspensions to one (or more) of five common causes. The first was slow, doubtful, or worthless paper. The term worthless paper indicated an asset with little or no value. The term doubtful paper meant an asset unlikely to yield book value. The term slow paper meant an asset likely to yield full value in time, but whose repayment lagged or which could not be converted to full cash value at short notice. The second common cause of suspension was heavy withdrawals, the typical example being a bank run. The third was failure a banking correspondent. Correspondents were banks with ongoing relationships facilitated by deposits of funds. A typical example is a county bank (the client or respondent) which kept its reserve deposits within and cleared its checks through a national bank in a reserve city (the correspondent). The fourth common cause was mismanagement. The fifth was defalcation, a monetary deficiency in the accounts of a bank due to fraud or breach of trust. the change in status, and additional information about the transaction, such as the identities of the institutions with which it merged and whether a bank reorganized before it reopened. Combining the St. 6386 forms and the bank-balance sheet data described above yields a cross-sectional database of banks on the eve of the financial crisis at the beginning of July in 1931. These sources also yield a panel database of banks in July of each year from 1929 through 1932. These databases contain information about banks' characteristics, financial health, and fates of greater detail than in any other extant source.
Data on economic conditions comes from several sources. 16 and press releases from the office of the bank superintendent (published in the New York Times and Wall Street Journal) indicate the conclusions of New York's regulatory authorities concerning the cause of each bank closure. The Annual Report also indicates recoveries from banks in liquidation and payments to depositors, which reveals the extent of insolvency at institutions in receivership. The microfilmed call reports for national and Federal Reserve member banks contain examiners reports on the financial health of each institution. These assessments indicate the extent of each bank's losses on investments (both past and predicted) and recommendations as to whether the bank should remain in operations, increase its reserves, consolidate with another institution, or cease operations.
Several sources provide a narrative history of events influencing the central money market in New York City during the summer and fall of 1931. The Annual Report of the Superintendent of Banks discusses events perceived to be important, changes in the regulatory regime, and the closure and consolidation of institutions. The report also indicates the number, salaries, experience, and assignments of bank examiners, as well as the reason for changes in the size of the examination staff. Newspapers and periodicals -including the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Bradstreet's Weekly, Dun's Review, Commercial and Financial Chronicle, and Bankers ' Magazine -regularly discussed events influencing banks in New York City. All of these outlets, for example, published articles about the demise of The Bank of United States, the investigation into the causes of its collapse, the public and legislative outcry over regulators' role in these events, and the regulatory agencies reactions to this adverse publicity.
III. Aggregate Patterns -Apparent Link Between Germany and New York
An initial inspection of the evidence suggests the existence of a direct connection between the banking crisis in Germany and bank distress in New York. The chronological correlation is striking. Figure 1 illuminates the relationship. The figure plots weekly hazard rates for liquidation and consolidation due to financial difficulties for banks in New York City from July 1930 through March 1933. The hazard function is a non-parametric estimate constructed by smoothing raw hazard rates (i.e. the number of bank liquidations divided by the number of banks at risk each week and the number of consolidations due to financial difficulties divided by the number of banks at risk in each week). The kernel is Epanechnikov. The bandwidth is two weeks, which is wide enough to reveal trends without obscuring short-term shifts in the probability of failure. Notes: The hazard function is a non-parametric estimate constructed by smoothing raw hazard rates (i.e. the number of bank liquidations divided by the number of banks at risk each week and the number of consolidations due to financial difficulties divided by the number of banks at risk in each week). The kernel is Epanechnikov. The bandwidth is two weeks, which is wide enough to reveal trends without obscuring short-term shifts in the probability of failure. Figure 1 shows that the probability of failure rose rapidly at the beginning of July, as the European banking panic spread through central Europe. The increase accelerated as bank runs swept through Germany, and the German government shut down their nation's banking system. The probability of failure peaked in August, immediately after the reopening of banks in Germany but preceding Britain's departure from gold. Table 1 provides additional details about the banks that failed in New York City during the Great Contraction. The table lists all of the banks forced to change status due to financial difficulties from January 1, 1929 through December 31, 1933. The fourth column indicates the type of change forced on the bank. Two types of changes predominated. The letter L indicates that the bank entered receivership and experienced liquidation. In all cases but one, the liquidation began at the behest of the superintendent of banks of the state of New York, after bank examiners determined that the institution faced financial difficulties so severe that it had to be closed to protect the interests of depositors and usually after determining that no other bank wished to consolidate with the afflicted institution. The exception was the Queensboro National Bank, whose directors decided to turn the institution over to receivers. The letter C indicates that financial difficulties compelled the bank to consolidate with another institution. Most of these consolidations occurred at the behest of regulators after examinations revealed looming financial problems. Typical situations involved banks lacking liquidity or banks whose capital had been consumed by investment losses. Regulators threatened to close such institution unless their directors resolved the problems by injecting additional funds or merging with another institution. Many institutions that liquidated (i.e. L) had also sought consolidation, but failed to reach an agreement with another organization in time to forestall receivership. Table 1 's first column indicates the date at which the bank closed its doors to depositors or consummated a consolidation with another institution. More than 60 percent of these transactions (16 out of 26) occurred during the two month period bounded by the failure of the Darmstädter-und Nationalbank on July 13, 1931 and Britain's departure from gold on September 21, 1931. Only two banks failed in December 1930, a period that Friedman and Schwartz referred to as the First Banking Crisis. Only one bank failed during the winter of 1933, when the drain of gold threatened to shut down the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and forced the President to declare a national banking holiday. Only two banks failed in the wake of Britain's departure from gold. One additional institution temporarily suspended payments during that period.
The pattern appears clear. Bank distress in the central money market of the United States peaked during the European banking crisis in the summer of 1931. The correlation suggests that a direct connection existed between financial events in New York and on the continent, particularly Germany. Several channels could have linked banks on both sides of the Atlantic including foreign deposits, foreign debts, and correspondent relationships.
IV. Econometric Methods and Results
The existence of detailed microdata on the potential channels of transmission allows us to test for a direct link between bank distress in Europe and New York. Our econometric methods resemble those of Isabel Schnabel, 17 Martin H. Petri, 18 and Richardson and Troost." We regress indications of banks' performance on (i) variables gathered from banks' balance sheets, (ii) variables indicating banks' financial health, (iii) variables indicating banks' exposure to international debts, deposits, and financial flows, and (iv) variables indicating fundamental forces affecting the aggregate economy. We examine a wide array of specifications commonly used in the literature, and test the statistical robustness of our result. Table 2 raises issues important for analyzing the evidence. The table reveals raw correlations between distressed departures from the banking business (i.e. liquidations, consolidations due to financial difficulties, and voluntary liquidations) and characteristics of banks. The correlations come from data on national and state member banks because for them detailed data on foreign exposure exists. The data comes from Comptroller of Currency call reports described in the preceding section. Similar data does not exist for state banks that did not belong to the Federal Reserve System. For those institutions, data on foreign holdings is limited. For non-member banks, the New York State Bank Superintendent's Office did not publish information on the topic, in large part, because non-members lacked substantial foreign operations. Rand McNally Bankers ' Directory published limited information on the topic, consisting of the names of foreign correspondents institutions, and in a few cases, foreign branches and foreign holdings. The information that does exist suggests that nonmember banks had little (and usually no) foreign operations and had limited foreign exposure. Excluding them from our econometric analysis does not distort our findings.
In Table 2 column (3) reports results for the 51 national banks that operated in New York City during the summer of 1931. For national banks, the only call reports that survive from the five years preceding the time under investigation come from December 1929. We draw data for national banks from this source. Column (2) reports results for the 29 state-member banks that operated in New York City during the summer of 1931. For state-member banks, call reports survive for each of the June and December calls in the five years preceding the crisis under investigation. The high frequency of the extant evidence enables us to draw data from the June 1931 call, which indicates their financial status on June 30, 1931, a few weeks prior to the events under investigation.
Column (1) reports results for the national and state-member banks pooled together, a total of 80 institutions. For the variables in group (A), the correlation coefficients indicate the relationship between basic indicators of financial health and distressed departures from the banking business. The correlations are consistent with those commonly found in the literature. Banks with higher net worth failed less often than banks with lower net worth. Banks with more reserves failed less often than banks with fewer reserves. Banks with more liquid resources as a percentage of assets failed less often than banks with less liquid resources.
The correlation coefficients in group (B) indicate the relationship between foreign exposure and distressed departures from the banking business. All six of the correlation coefficients are negative, indicating that the more foreign exposure possessed by banks, the lower the likelihood of their failure. The correlation coefficients in group (C) indicate the relationship between bank distress and foreign exposure as a share of total resources. The majority of these correlation coefficients are negative, indicating once again, that banks with greater foreign exposure failed at lower rates. The inverse correlation between foreign exposure and failure found in the microdata suggests that foreign exposure may not have been the reason that banks failed in New York City during the summer of 1931. Sources: See text. Table 3 reinforces this result. The table reports cross tabulations between the incidence of bank distress and several measures of foreign exposure. The cross tabulation shows that none of the banks that departed from the banking business in the summer of 1931 possessed foreign branches, while two of the banks that survived the summer possessed such branches. The second cross tabulation shows that none of the banks that departed from the banking business in the summer of 1931 possessed time deposits from financial institutions in foreign countries, while eight of the banks that survived the summer possessed such deposits. The third cross tabulation shows that none of the banks that departed from the banking business in the summer of 1931 belonged to syndicates that extended loans to Germany during the 1920s, while four of the banks that survived the summer lead such syndicates. One way to circumvent this problem is to drop the perfect classifiers from the regression. But in our case, that strategy appears unpromising. The perfect classifiers include three key measures of foreign exposure: branches, deposits, and loans. In each case, banks that possessed this type of foreign exposure survived the crisis of the summer of 1931 (and the remainder of the contraction). This information is important and should not be discarded from the analysis for computational convenience. The other measures of foreign exposure turn out to be near perfect classifiers. For example, almost all banks with foreign exposure of any type survived the crisis in the summer of 1931 (and the entire depression). In such circumstances, discrete choice estimators do not possess optimal properties.
A solution to this problem is the linear probability model. This model incorporates perfect classifiers without difficulty, although coefficients estimated from it may be inefficient and, in certain circumstances, biased. These properties could be cause for concern, but our examination of the residuals from our regressions suggests that neither problem afflicts our estimates to a substantial degree. Table 4 presents estimates based upon this model. The unit of observation is an individual bank. The data for each bank is drawn from the call report for the date closest to June 30, 1931. The dependent variable equals one if the bank consolidated due to financial difficulties, entered receivership at the behest of regulators, or liquidated voluntarily between July 1, 1931 and December 31, 1931. The dependent variable equals zero otherwise. This indicator for bank distress is regressed on a vector of explanatory variables, including various measures of exposure to foreign financial forces and a vector of bank characteristics. The balance sheet characteristics includes standard measures of financial health such as net worth as a share of total resources, government securities as a share of total resources, other securities as a share of total resources, reserves as a share of total resources, total deposits, and demand deposits as a fraction of total deposits. Other bank characteristics include the number of correspondents, the jurisdiction of its charter, and the age of the organization. All of these coefficients possess signs and magnitudes consistent with previously published studies, and therefore, are not reported in the table. The coefficients of interest are those on the variables indicating exposure to potential channels for the transmission of the foreign financial crisis.
Column (1) reports these coefficients for a regression, pooling data on all of the national and state member banks operating in the central money market on July 1, 1931. The signs of many coefficients are negative, indicating that increasing foreign exposure along that dimension reduced the likelihood of failure. For example, the coefficient on Foreign Government Bonds Owned, -0.034, suggests that increasing a bank's holdings of foreign government bonds by $1,000,000 reduced the likelihood of the bank's failure by 3.4 percent. The magnitudes of the positive coefficients are small, suggesting that if increasing foreign exposure along that dimension increased the probability of failure, the increase was minimal. The standard errors of the coefficients are large relative to the magnitudes. T-tests indicate that for each coefficient, the hypothesis that the coefficient equals zero cannot be rejected. An F-test indicates that the hypothesis that the all of the coefficients jointly equal zero cannot be rejected.
Column (2) indicates the results when the sample is limited to the 29 state-member banks that operated in New York City during the summer of 1931. The results are similar. The signs of most of the coefficients are negative. The magnitudes of the positive coefficients are small. T-tests indicate that for each coefficient, the hypothesis that the coefficient equals zero cannot be rejected. An F-test indicates that the hypothesis that the all of the coefficients jointly equal zero cannot be rejected. Sources: See text.
Column (3) indicates the results when the sample is limited to the 51 national banks that operated in New York City during the summer of 1931. The results resemble those for the
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43 first two regressions. The signs on several of the coefficients are negative. An F-test indicates that the hypothesis that the all of the coefficients jointly equal zero cannot be rejected. T-tests on individual coefficients reject the hypothesis of equality with zero in four cases at the five percent level and in another case at the ten percent level. This statistical result entails an examination of the magnitude of these effects. Table 5 undertakes this task by comparing for each bank their foreign financial exposure with the probability of failure predicted by the regression (1) in Table 4 . The seven dimensions of foreign financial exposure for which we have data are closely correlated. From the seven vectors of these variables, we can create an index of foreign financial exposure by deriving the principal components. The first principal component is a linear transformation of the vectors that explains the greatest possible variance in the data. This first principal component serves as our index. Banks for which the value of the index is lowest have the least foreign financial exposure. Banks for which the value of the index is highest have the most foreign financial exposure. 
Notes:
The extent of foreign exposure is measured as the first principal component derived from the variables measuring exposure to foreign financial factors in the regression in Table 6 .
Source: See text.
For quintiles organized according to the extent of foreign exposure, Table 5 reports the average probability of distress predicted by regression (1) in Table 4 and the standard deviation of that average. The probability of failure appears constant across quintiles. Two-tailed tests cannot reject the null hypotheses of equality among the averages of the quintiles at standard significance levels. Only the banks with the largest foreign financial exposure appear to have a significantly lower probability of distress. For the eight banks with the highest foreign exposure, the predicted probability of distress is approximately two percent. For the two banks possessing networks of foreign branches, the predicted probability of distress is less than one percent. Figure 2 summarizes these results. The vertical axis indicates the predicted probability of distress. The horizontal axis indicates our index of foreign financial exposure. The observations plot the predictions for each of the 80 banks in our sample. The pattern appears clear.
For banks possessing low levels of foreign financial exposure, the probability of distress was independent of the extent of exposure. For banks possessing the highest levels of foreign financial exposure, however, the probability of distress was low and inversely correlated with the extent of exposure. In other words, banks with substantial foreign exposure failed much lower rates than other institutions, and as the extent of foreign exposure increased, the probability of failure fell. This econometric result seems reasonable, since all of the banks in New York City with substantial foreign financial exposure survived the depression. 
No Exposure Foreign Financial Exposure Max Exposure
Notes: The vertical axis indicates the probability of experiencing distress predicted by regression (1) in Table 4 . The horizontal access indicates the first principal component of the seven measures of foreign financial exposure listed as independent variables in Table 4 .
Sources: See text.
V. Contemporary Conclusions about the Causes of Bank Distress
Econometric evidence has advantages and disadvantages. Econometrics employs the power of statistics to illuminate relationships between variables after controlling for the influence of others. But, statistical inference remains vulnerable to the dangers of misspecification and misinterpretation. Statistical studies are also limited by paucity of data which, for financial institutions operating during the Great Depression, consists of infrequent observations of a subset of the relevant variables. The conclusions of contemporary observers complement such statistical evidence. Observers such as Federal Reserve agents, bank examiners, accountants, economists, and journalists had access to an array of information unavailable to modern scholars, including detailed, daily data about the financial status of and events affecting commercial banks. Contemporary observers also had the ability to talk with the man on the spot and possessed in-depth knowledge about the institutions and issues at hand.
Detailed records survive from several sets of contemporary observers. The first (and arguably the most important) is the St. 6386 database constructed by the Federal Reserve Board's Division of Bank Operations. Table 6 summarizes the results of the Division's analysis of bank suspensions. In eleven of 14 cases, the primary cause of suspension was the depreciation in the value of the bank's assets. In two cases, heavy withdrawals were the primary cause of suspension. In another case, a bank failed after losing a substantial share of its capital to embezzlement. Comments written on the St. 6386 forms discuss reasons for the depreciation in the value of the bank's portfolio, principally the declining value of stocks, corporate bonds, and real estate. In all cases, the comments refer to declines of domestic assets. In no instance do the comments refer to foreign investments or German debt.
The Division of Bank Operations also tracked consolidations due to financial difficulties. Table 7 summarizes the results of this endeavor. All but one of the banks forced to consolidate in 1931 suffered from frozen assets or impaired capital. The examiners who discovered these afflictions reached conclusions like Midwood Trust Company's condition was "such as to necessitate its being taken over by some other institution." 20 Long Island National Bank's health was "such as to necessitate an immediate absorption. [...] The condition of the International Trust Company was such as to make desirable their being taken over by a stronger institution." In almost all of these cases, the absorbing bank took all of the assets of the troubled bank in exchange for assuming the deposits and some, but not all, of the other liabilities of the troubled institution. The Division of Bank Operations attributed the financial difficulties to domestic factors. In no instance does the Division discuss international events, deposits, or debts.
Like the Division of Bank Operations, the New York State Bank Superintendent's office investigated the cause of suspension for each state-chartered bank, trust company, and private bank. These amounted to 13 of the 14 institutions that closed their doors to depositors during the summer of 1931. The superintendent released initial statements about the cause of each closure on the date that the institution closed its doors and in the weekly bulletin of the Department of Banking. Final conclusions appeared in the Department of Banking's Annual Report. So did information about the rate of recovery from institutions undergoing liquidation. These sources described the cause of Chelsea Bank's and Trust Companies demise to be "rumors" that circulated "which have caused abnormal withdrawals of deposits," prompting the examiners to close the bank to conserve its assets. In all other instances, the sources contained statements such as "because of a non-liquid condition and depreciation of its assets, it is unsafe and inexpedient to permit the institution to continue in business." The Department of Banking attributed the financial difficulties of all of these institutions to domestic factors, particularly the declining values of securities, bonds, and real estate, which reduced the value and liquidity of banks' portfolios. In no instance does the Department of Banking discuss international factors, such as foreign deposits or German debt. 
The conclusions of contemporary observers seem clear. During the summer of 1931, the banks that ceased operations did so for reasons unrelated to the financial crisis in Europe. The source of distress was the declining value of domestic assets -principally real estate, stocks, and bonds -and withdrawals from banks which appeared to be headed for financial trouble. The banks that closed their doors or consolidated with other institutions did not due so because foreign depositors withdrew funds or because German debt declined in value.
Might there be something that contemporary observers missed? Perhaps the banking crisis in Germany altered patterns of mergers among American banks. For years, depository institutions had been combining operations, as growing banks absorbed smaller competitors and turned them into branches. Perhaps patterns of these mergers changed, forcing banks that would have merged voluntarily into the hands of regulators who ordered them either to consolidate on less advantageous terms or to depart from the banking business. Notes'. The series for consolidations is identical to that in Figure 1 . The hazard rate for mergers is a non-parametric estimate constructed by kernel-smoothing raw hazard rates (i.e. mergers per week divided by number of banks at risk). The kernel is Epanechnikov. The bandwidth is five weeks. Figure 1 . The estimate for the latter is constructed by kernel-smoothing raw hazard rates for mergers of healthy banks (i.e. mergers per week divided by number of banks at risk). The kernel is Epanechnikov. The bandwidth is five weeks. The rate of mergers follows no discernible trend. It varies from month to month but the distribution remains roughly constant over time. The rate of consolidations due to distress follows a dramatically different pattern. Almost all the banks that consolidate this way do so during 1931. The largest cluster occurs during July and August, the months when the banking panic peaked on the continent. Consider another possibility. Perhaps widespread withdrawals from foreign accounts occurred, putting pressure on the central money market as a whole, which forced the weakest banks in New York City out of business. Our econometric analysis might have missed an event such as this, because the annual, quarterly, and cross-sectional databases which we analyze lack high-frequency deposit data which could detect such shifts. But, other data sets contain weekly data on deposits in New York City banks. These data sets include the column "New York Weekly Bank Statements" published each week in the New York Times and the compilation of member bank balance sheets released weekly by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, published in many periodicals (e.g. Bradstreet's Weekly, Dun's Review, The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, and 
VI. Contemporary Accounts Reveal the Cause of the Correlation
This essay began with an observation about the Great Depression -the period of acute bank distress in the central money market of the United States followed closely on the banking crisis in Germany and preceded Britain's abandonment of the gold standard -and then this essay produced a puzzle. No financial link appears to have existed between the banking crisis on the continent and in New York City. The banks that failed in New York lacked exposure to foreign deposits, German debt, and other factors that may have transmitted the financial crisis across the Atlantic. Numerous banks in New York had substantial exposure to such sources of contagion. This exposure included hundreds of millions of dollars in foreign deposits, over one billion dollars in German debt, and large holdings of foreign assets. But, the institutions engaged in the international banking business survived the contraction. These internationally-oriented institutions were an island of strength in a sea of turmoil. Their prosperity seems surprising, relative to the performance of other American banks, which failed in droves during the downturn.
What can resolve the riddle? Why was bank distress in the central money market chronologically correlated with the banking crisis on the continent despite the fact that banks with financial links to Europe survived the contraction? Our research reveals an important piece of the puzzle. The behavior of the New York's Banking Department changed during the 26 The superintendent argued that the rejected reforms would have provided him with the ability to forestall the failure of The Bank of United States. Critics of the Superintendent, including many legislators on the banking committee, asserted that the superintendent possessed more than enough authority to have prevented the crisis had he acted when irregularities at The Bank of United States were first brought to his attention in 1929.
Criticism of the superintendent, Joseph Broderick, peaked in June, when the case against the directors of the Bank of United States reached trial. A New York Times headline blared "State Called Lax In Bank Failures." 27 Another headline reported that the superintendent had been accused of "Gross Negligence" for his performance on The Bank of United States.
28 A former state attorney general circulated a letter calling for a general investigation of the banking department and drawing parallels between its performance in the current case and problems in the past. The chairman of the Republican State Committee sent a letter to Governor Roosevelt requesting an inquiry and demanding the removal of Superintendent Broderick.
2 ' The state legislature discussed the creation of a special committee to investigate the banking department and considered a bill authorizing suits against state bank employees who performed their jobs negligently.
The chorus of criticism focused on the banking department's procrastination after discovering the financial problems faced by The Bank of United States. In statement and testimony in hearings concerning The Bank of United States, the superintendent revealed that the irregularities which lead to the bank's demise were first brought to his attention in the summer of 1929. Then, he believed that "he would have been 'gravely remiss in his sworn duty if he did not exhaust every possible resource to save the situation before deciding that the doors must be closed'."
30 He allowed The Bank of United States to continue operations for more than a year, and during that time, to continue conducting certain transactions, "which he admits were dishonest even if inside the letter of the law," and to continue to accumulate losses, in hopes that some remedy for the situation would be found. Now, the superintendent planned to deal with such situations expeditiously, and requested an expansion of his powers to enable him to take control of banks whenever he deemed it in the public interest. He planned to encourage the consolidation of banks "in cases where it appeared the result would be generally beneficial. This tendency toward consolidation, resulting as it does in the disappearance of many independent units, effects a concentration of banking resources and improved management which should lend itself to the development of sound policies and the elimination of unwarranted competition." 3 ' The impact of the superintendent's new policies and increased authority can be seen in the wave of examinations that swept New York City in the summer of 1931. New stringent procedures highlighted investment losses and potential problems at numerous institutions. The superintendent's office moved swiftly to rectify such shortfalls. The department demanded that the bank's shareholders, directors, and management come up with capital to cover the losses, or consolidate with other institutions, which typically required them to realize large losses (in many cases, their entire investment), or face seizure by the superintendent's office. A dramatic climax of the campaign came on August 5, when the Superintendent Broderick seized three banks (American Union, International Madison, and Times Square Trust), on the same morning. The seizures upset the plans of the joint legislative committee on banking to hold a hearing at the Bar Association Building that afternoon to discuss the recommendations of Mr. Broderick and the performance of the banking department. The announcement cancelling the hearings noted that "the taking over of the three banks made it impossible for Mr. Broderick or the bankers to appear before the committee."
32 During the next three weeks, Superintendent Broderick oversaw the liquidation of those three depositories, compelled the consolidation of an additional five New York City banks, and supervised the examination and sanctioning of number other institutions. His office remained so busy that the public hearings on his performance appear to have been postponed indefinitely.
While it is impossible to know for sure why the banking department's behavior changed suddenly and substantially during the summer of 1931, it seems likely that the enhanced impact of bank supervision stemmed from changes in the resources available to the department, changes in de jure and de facto regulatory authority, and changes in the incentives and attitudes of the superintendent and his staff. It seems clear that this change produced the spike in suspensions in the central money market that appears to be closely correlated with the financial crisis in Europe. The timing of the suspensions in New York appears to have been a delayed reaction to the failure of The Bank of United States. The reaction took place eight months after the trigger because it took time to deploy additional regulatory resources and because it took time for political pressures (and perhaps learning by doing) to alter the mindset of the regulators. It is possible that concern about the banking crisis on the continent could have played a role in altering the behavior of banking authorities, but our extensive searches have uncovered no evidence to support this hypothesis.
VII. Discussion
A clear correlation exists between the banking crisis in Germany following the collapse of the Creditanstalt and the surge in bank distress in New York City during the summer of 1931. The onset of the surge coincided with the closing weeks of the financial crisis in Germany. The onset of the surge began one month before Britain departed from gold. The large German debt sponsored by New York City banks and the large European deposits held by New York City Banks provided potential channels for the transmission of the banking panic across the Atlantic.
However, a wide range of evidence demonstrates that those direct links between the banking systems in Europe and the United States did not lead to the failure of American depository institutions. Instead, the New York banks with substantial foreign exposure survived the contraction and, unlike other banks in United States, continued to earn profits throughout the 32 New York Times, August 6,1931, p. 32.
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53 depression. These facts indicate that the correlation between the banking crisis in Germany and New York was coincidental, not causal.
This realization raises several issues regarding the study of bank distress during the Great Depression. The first pertains to the uniqueness of the United States central money market. Scholars have long recognized that the pattern of distress among in New York City differed from the pattern of distress for the national as a whole. In New York City, few banks closed their doors to depositors, while in the rest of the nation nearly half of all banks went out of business. Our study suggests that the behavior of the state banking department had much to do with the stability of banks in the central money market. The superintendent's office actively merged weak banks with stronger institutions. The law required banks in New York City to hold larger reserves and greater capital than depository institutions elsewhere in the nation. These legal requirements left a large cushion between the onset of difficulties and the point of no return. The superintendent used this cushion as a window of opportunity to resolve bank distress short of receivership. The superintendent's vigilance meant that few institutions failed in New York City and those that did go out of business returned substantial sums to depositors.
A second issue is the political economy of bank regulation. Decisions by the banking department determined the fate of many firms and substantially influenced the health of all banks. What influenced the decisions made by the superintendent of banks and his subordinates? Ideology, experience, politics, legislation, and self interest all played a part. The superintendent's treatment of troubled banks changed over time. Changing economic conditions may have been one reason. The optimal method of resolving financial difficulties depends on the short-term prospects for sustaining cash flow and the long-term prospects for earning profits. Both factors fluctuated during the 1930s. Changing legislation was another reason. Politicians provided the banking department with additional tools for dealing with bedeviled banks. Political decisions also changed the incentives of the superintendent of banks, who had been appointed as a reformer in the spring of 1929 and was criticized as incompetent two years later. The failure of The Bank of United States was the principal cause of criticism. Its demise led to changes in the banking department's authority, to changes in procedures, and to political pressures which pushed the superintendent of banks to take a prophylactic approach towards imperiled banks.
A third issue concerns correlations between events in financial centers in the United States and Europe. Causal links may have created some of these correlations. But, this essay shows that coincidences created others. This realization suggests that there is a danger of drawing false inferences from correlations exhibited in this data.
A final issue concerns the international transmission of the banking crisis in the summer and fall of 1931. Numerous channels could have transmitted the financial crisis across the Atlantic. Direct links between banks in Europe and the United States appear to have been plausible candidates, but this essay demonstrates that those direct links did not, in fact, speed the spread of the affliction. Thus, golden fetters remain the principal explanation for the trans-Atlantic transmission of the financial panic in the fall of 1931.
While our conclusion conflicts with the claims of several recent scholars, it concurs with the consensus of seminal scholars who have studied the issue, including Eichengreen,
